The crucial issue of quantum communication protocol is its security. A quantum communication scheme must be based on the existing or nearly existing technology, but its security must be guaranteed against an eavesdropper whose technology is limited only by the laws of quantum mechanics. In this paper, we show that all the deterministic and direct two-way quantum communication protocols, sometimes called ping-pong (PP) protocols, are insecure when the eavesdropper uses the invisible photon eavesdropping (IPE) scheme to eavesdrop on the communication. In this IPE scheme, an eavesdropper can obtain full information of the communication with zero risk of being detected. Finally, we discuss the possible modification of PP-type protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum communication, or more precisely called quantum key distribution (QKD), is a physically secure method for the distribution of a secure key between to distant partners, Alice and Bob, who share a quantum channel and public authentificated channel [1] . Since the pioneer work of QKD by Bennett and Brassward in 1984 (BB84) [2] , many theoretical proposals [3] and experimental realizations [4] have been presented. With the efforts of physicists and engineers, QKD may be the first commercial application of quantum physics at single photon level [1] .
The crucial issue of a QKD protocol is its security. In [5] , Brassard, Lütkenhaus, Mor and Sanders presented a criteria for a protocol which can be considered as practical and secure:
In order to be practical and secure, a quantum key distribution scheme must be based on existing-or nearly existing-technology, but its security must be guaranteed against an eavesdropper with unlimited computing power whose technology is limited only by the laws of quantum mechanics. Along this line, we can present an eavesdropping scheme on the deterministic and direct two-way quantum communication protocols to gain full information of the key without being detected. The first deterministic and direct two-way quantum communication protocol, sometimes called ping-pong (PP) protocol, was presented by Boström and Felbinger [6] and its security was extensively studied [7] . After that this PP protocol was enhanced with dense coding feature [8, 9] . And then it was extended to single photon implementation [10] [11] [12] .
In this paper, an invisible photon eavesdropping (IPE) scheme is presented, which reveals that the PP-type protocols are insecure under the eavesdropper-Eve's invisible photon eavesdropping attack. In IPE scheme, Eve first selects a photon which is insensitive for Alice and Bob's single photon detectors, i.e., Eve's such photon is invisible for Alice and Bob. She adds this invisible photon to the travel pulse and forwards them to Alice. After Eve's IPE scheme can be described as follow: Eve first prepares a photon in the states Likewise, Eve can eavesdrop on in the single photon PP protocol [10] [11] [12] In the case of dense coding protocol [8, 9] , Eve can also obtain full of Alice's information with zero risk. In the dense coding protocol, one travel photon can be encoded with two-bit information. On this occasion, Eve will prepare an entangled photon pair first. She stores one photon and sends the other one to Alice to gain information. Here, photon Eve uses is also invisible for Alice.
III. EXPERIMENTAL POSSIBILITY OF THE IPE SCHEME.
In experiment, the single photon detector is only sensitive to a special wavelength, and it can be used near such wavelength. E.g., a commercial silicon-based single photon detector is used for near infrared wavelengths 600 nm to 900 nm. And a single-electron transistor consisting of a semiconductor quantum dot in high magnetic field can help one to detect the single far-infrared photons in the wavelength range 175-210 microm [13] . Thus, Eve can select a wavelength which is far away from the wavelength Alice and Bob use. In control mode, Alice can not detect Eve's invisible photon. In message mode, Alice only performs encoding operations which can be implemented by using some linear optical elements. Because the number of photons and the polarization of the photon are communicative, Eve's eavesdropping action does not disturb the state of Alice and Bob's travel photon. Eve can distinguish her photon from the travel photon because of the different wavelengths. In this case, Eve can achieve full of Alice's information with zero risk of being detected. In fact, Eve does not need to gain full of Alice's information: The final key is not secure any longer as long as information Eve gains is bigger than the mutual information between Alice and Bob.
IV. POSSIBLE MODIFICATION OF THE PP-TYPE PROTOCOLS.
The favor of the PP protocols is that information can be transmitted in a deterministic and direct way. In order to transmit information securely, the PP-type protocols should be modified. In PP protocol, Alice encodes her message directly after she received the travel photon in message mode, which can be utilized by Eve. In order to be secure, the entangled photon pair PP type protocol [6] can be modified as follow: Alice first prepare an entangled photon pair. She keeps one photon (second photon) and sends the other one (first photon) to Bob. After receiving the first photon, Bob can select the control mode to verify the security of the communication. Otherwise, the can select the message to transmit information. In message mode, Alice performs her encoding operations on the second photon and then sends it to Bob. After receiving the second qubit, Bob performs a measurement on the photon pair to draw Alice's information. At the end of the communication, they publish some of their bits to gain the QBER. Essentially, such modification is a two-step quantum communication protocol using entangled photon pair [14] . In fact, this modification does not increase the complexity of the communication. Information can be transmitted directly and securely.
Eve's IPE scheme is useless since she has no chance to send her photon to Alice to gain information.
Likewise, the single photon PP type protocols [10] [11] [12] an n-photon pulse before Alice's encoding operations, and then performs measurement on her n photons after receiving her n photons from Alice. Alice can estimate the state of the n photons precisely by increasing n. However, if Alice's rotating angle θ is random, Eve can not distinguish which encoding operation Alice performed. In this way, information can be transmitted directly and securely. Thus, the single photon PP type protocol can be modified as three-way (Ping-Pong-Ping) quantum communication protocols. Unfortunately, such three-way protocol can be attacked by using sophisticated photon-number-splitting (PNS) attacks when imperfect single photon sources are used [17] : Eve first measures the number of photons after (a.1) and captures one ("PNS photon") if there are two or more photons in the pulses. Then Eve sends the other photons to Bob through her lossless channel.
After (a.2), Eve adds an n-photon pulse in the standard state |0 to Alice's pulse and forwards them to Alice and then she captures her own n photons after (a.3). Eve measures her n photons to estimate their state. The optimum state estimation from n qubits gives the maximal mean fidelity [16] 
The number solution for Eq. (1) 
